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AUCTIONS WITH POSITIVE SYNERGIES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In a standard auction, bidders bid more aggressively when the number of bidders 
increases.  However, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996, Games and Economic Behavior) 
show that when bidders have multiple-unit demand that generates positive synergies, 
bidders bid less aggressively as the number of bidders increases.  The first objective of 
this paper is to offer experimental evidence on this seemingly counter-intuitive 
theoretical prediction.  Following the model of Krishna and Rosenthal, we design a 
simultaneous second-price sealed-bid auction for two objects with two types of bidders: 
Single-object and multiple-object demand bidders.  Our results show that bidders bid less 
aggressively with increased competition.  The second objective is to investigate the effect 
of offering global bidders the option of bidding for both objects as a package as well as 
submitting individual bids for each object. Controlling for bidders’ valuations, we find 
that offering this option to global bidders increases allocative efficiency and seller’s 
revenue. 
 
Keywords: Auction, Positive Synergies, Increased Competition, Package Bids.  
JEL Classification: C91, D44 
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1 Introduction 
 
When there are more bidders bidding for various objects in an auction, do bidders bid 
more or less aggressively?  In a standard auction assuming independent private valuations, 
bidders bid more aggressively (Vickrey, 1961; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Battalio, et al, 
1990). However, when bidders have demand for multiple objects with positive synergies, 
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) show that bidders bid less aggressively with more bidders.  
Positive synergies are present when the value of a package exceeds the summed value of 
the individual objects in that package.  Positive synergies may arise due to economies of 
scale, complementarities, cost savings due to a firm’s geographical advantage, 
specialization, etc.  
 
The presence of positive synergies in a multiple-object auction brings up another 
important question: Should sellers sell the objects separately or offer them as a package?  
By allowing package bids, sellers could capture some of the synergies from the bidders’ 
valuation and hence increase revenue.  Palfrey (1985), in a laboratory experiment, finds 
that packaging is inefficient in allocating individual objects to the bidder with the highest 
valuation.  Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006) in an empirical study of the London bus 
routes auction conclude that the social benefits of allowing combinatorial bidding on 
various combinations of bus routes are ambiguous.  Bykowsky, et al (2000) warn that 
bidders may incur financial losses due to “mutually destructive bidding.”  Rothkopf, et al 
(1998) point out two disadvantages to bundling objects: a “threshold” problem and the 
computational difficulty involved in generating the revenue-maximizing combination for 
the package.  The “threshold” problem recognizes that single-object bidders with high 
stand-alone private values may not be able to submit a coordinated bid that is higher than 
a bid submitted by a multiple-object bidder with lower stand-alone private values. 
 
The purpose of this study is to offer experimental tests of the two questions above: When 
bidders have multiple-object demand with positive synergies (1) Do bidders bid more or 
less aggressively when there are more bidders?  (2) Should sellers sell the objects 
separately or as a package?  We utilize the model of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) to 
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design a simultaneous second-price sealed-bid auction. The auction game in our 
experiment involves two objects and two types of bidders: Local bidders with single-
object demand and global bidders with multiple-object demand with positive synergies.  
To address the first question, we conduct treatments with different number of bidders. To 
address the second question, we conduct treatments in which the bidders are given the 
option of bidding for the entire package as well as bidding for individual objects. 
 
Our results confirm the theoretical prediction of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) that global 
bidders bid less aggressively when there are more rival bidders.  We also find that 
allocative efficiency and sellers’ revenue are higher when the bidders are given the option 
of bidding for the entire package of objects as well as bidding for individual objects.  In 
addition, our results indicate that local bidders bid higher than their valuations while 
global bidders bid less than their predicted levels.  Our results further indicate an 
asymmetry in the bidding behavior of high- and low-private value bidders.  Compared to 
the high-private value bidders, low-private value bidders submit bids with larger positive 
differences from their private values. 
 
Our paper contributes to the existing experimental literature on the effect of number of 
bidders by extending the analysis from bidders with single-object demand to bidders with 
multiple-object demand that generates positive synergies.  Our findings could be useful in 
the optimal design of auctions for selling multiple complementary objects. 
 
Our experimental setting is relevant to many business applications. Situations where 
bidders have multiple-unit demand and have increasing marginal returns for multiple 
objects are rapidly becoming commonplace.  Examples include airline landing slot 
auctions (Rassenti, et al, 1982), Federal Communications Commission spectrum auction 
(Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996; Milgrom, 2000), procurement auctions (Katok and Roth, 
2004) and farmland auctions (Colwell and Yavas, 1994).  
 
Our paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature relating to 
bidding strategy, seller’s strategy and previous experiments on multi-object auction with 
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synergies.  Section 3 summarizes the theoretical predictions outlined in Krishna and 
Rosenthal (1996).  These predictions form part of the hypotheses in our analysis.  Section 
4 describes our experimental design.  Section 5 presents the experimental results.  Section 
6 concludes.  
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 The “Exposure” Problem 
 
When a bidder has multiple-object demand and gains positive synergies from obtaining 
these objects in one package, one of the bidder’s foremost considerations would be the 
“exposure” problem.  The nature of the “exposure” problem is different depending on 
whether the objects are interchangeable (U.S. treasury bills, initial public offerings of 
stocks shares and transferable pollution permits) or whether the objects are distinct 
(farmland, timber, off-shore oil leases, and bus-routes).  In the former case, the literature 
is concerned with demand-reduction behavior in uniform-price auction (Kagel and Levin, 
2001, 2005; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, et al, 2006). 
 
Our paper focuses on the latter case.  When the objects are sold separately, bidders may 
bid above their stand-alone value for the individual object.  This course of action has two 
effects.  The first effect increases bidders’ chances of winning all the desired objects in 
the package.  Palfrey (1985) conducts an experiment selling objects in packages using a 
first-price sealed-bid auction.  In his study, no synergies are present in the package; the 
value of a package is simply the sum of the stand-alone values of individual objects.  Yet, 
he finds that bidders are bidding higher than the summed value of the individual objects 
in the package. 
 
The second effect exposes bidders to financial losses if they do not win all the desired 
objects. The magnitude of the financial losses is correlated to the amount of over-bidding 
above the stand-alone value of the individual objects. Depending on factors such as 
bidders’ risk preferences, the severity  of potential losses, and bidders’ avoidance of the 
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“exposure” problem, bidders may not bid aggressively and at the extreme, may not 
participate in the bidding (Bykowsky, el at, 2000; Kagel and Levin, 2005).  Kagel and 
Levin (2005) term this a “behavioral” force and the responsiveness of bidders to this 
problem is akin to “loss aversion.”  The bidders’ behavior has implications for efficiency 
and revenue maximization. The objects may not be allocated to the bidder with the 
highest value for the package because the bidder is not willing to bid above the stand-
alone value of the individual object.  In addition, when bidders bid less aggressively, 
sellers are not able to capture a larger portion of the synergies from the bidders.    
 
In the case of a second-price sealed-bid auction, the highest bidder wins the object and 
pays the highest losing bid.  When there are more competitors, the price payable by the 
winning bidder, vis-à-vis the highest losing bid, is correspondingly higher.  As a result, 
bidders incur potentially larger losses when they bid above the stand-alone value.  
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) loosely term this as the “price-effect”.  We refer to the first 
of our research questions: Do bidders bid more or less aggressively when there are more 
bidders?  Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) prove theoretically that bidders bid less 
aggressively.  The intuitive explanation for this seemingly counter-intuitive result is that 
the “price-effect” is higher when there are more bidders.  Hence, the increased 
probability of making losses leads to less aggressive bidding. 
 
 
2.2 The Argument for Package Bidding
i
 
 
When a seller has multiple objects to auction, the seller could: (i) sell the objects 
separately; (ii) sell the objects as packages (combinatorialii); and (iii) sell the objects both 
                                                 
i Our discussion of package bidding here is not exhaustive.  We have narrowed our discussion to focus on 
issues related to the number of bidders and the option for package bidding.  Issues like ‘fitting’ problems, 
‘coordination’, auction rules covering stopping, activity and withdrawal rules, superadditive values versus 
subadditive values are important considerations when considering combinatorial auctions.  (See Plott, 1987; 
Ledyard, et al, 1997; Bykowsky, 2000; Cramton, et al, 2006). 
ii Cramton, et al (2006) define combinatorial auctions as auctions where bidders bid for combinations of 
objects, rather than for individual objects. [p. 1]. Rothkopf, et al (1998) define combinational bids 
synonymously to package bids.  Bykowsky, et al (2000) define a “package bid” as an auction where bidders 
can submit bids for both the individual objects as well as combinations of objects [p. 208].     
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separately and as packages (combinational).  Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006) note that 
when synergies are present, a combinatorial bidding option is necessary for efficiency 
and optimality.  Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) run a simulation and find that the 
simultaneous auction generates higher revenue for the seller than the combinational 
auction.  Bykowsky, et al. (2000) explain that when individual objects are sold 
simultaneously, bidders may engage in “mutually destructive bidding” leading to 
financial losses.  Hence, in some auctions, withdrawal rules are in place to permit bidders 
to withdraw their bids during the auction.  Plott (1987), in his testbed experiments, finds 
evidence of destructive competitive behavior where an agent may strive to acquire key 
objects in other competitors’ package.  
 
In the literature, regardless of the auction form analyzed, there seems to be two central 
arguments.  The first is that when there are a small number of bidders, bundling increases 
seller’s revenue (Palfrey, 1983, 1985; Chakraborty, 1999).  Selling objects in a package 
stimulates competition amongst the few bidders and thus raises revenue.   
 
The second is that when the number of bidders bidding for the items is large, packaging 
objects creates inefficiencies and lowers revenue due to the “threshold” problem.  When 
objects are sold separately, each object is sold to the highest bidder.  When there are 
many bidders, the price paid is likely to be high because the distributions of values are 
correspondingly high.  However, when the objects are packaged, the winning bidder may 
not have the highest valuation for each object in the package.  As a result, the summed 
value of selling each object individually may be higher than the value of selling the 
objects in a package (Palfrey, 1985; Rothkopf, et al, 1998; Chakraborty, 1999; Bykowsky, 
et. al., 2000; Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2006).      
 
When bidders incur costs to participate in the auction, then according to the theoretical 
work by Chakraborty (2006), objects should be sold separately.  The reasoning is that 
since competitive bidders self-select to participate in the auction, the competitive element 
induced by packaging objects would be rendered unnecessary. 
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In testbed experiments related to the FCC Spectrum auction, Ledyard, et al. (1987) and 
Plott (1987) find similar experimental results.  When there are significant 
complementarities, allowing package bidding improves efficiency and revenue.  Ledyard, 
et. al. (1987) conclude that in terms of mechanism performance, auctions that allow 
package bidding weakly dominate simultaneous auctions.  They also find that 
simultaneous auctions weakly dominate sequential auctions.     
 
2.3 Findings from Similar Experimental Studies  
 
In this section, we review two experimental papers on auctions with synergies and 
highlight findings that are relevant to our study.  Although the research questions are 
different, the experimental settings in Kagel and Levin (2005) and Isaac and James (2000) 
are similar to ours.   
 
Kagel and Levin (2005) investigate the bidding behavior of a bidder with multiple-unit 
demand with synergies in a uniform-price auction.  More specifically, they look at how a 
bidder would respond to the two counterbalancing forces of demand-reduction and 
superadditive gains.  The predictions for equilibrium behavior are similar to those by 
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996).  Two units are auctioned to two types of bidders.  There 
are three or five local bidders (played by computers) with single-unit demand and one 
global bidder (played by human subjects) with two-unit demand.  There are three key 
differences between our experimental designs.  Firstly, ours is a discriminatory auction 
with no demand reduction pressures.  Secondly, in our study both the local and global 
bidders are played by human subjects.  We have one local bidder and either two or five 
global bidders for each object.  Thirdly, the positive synergy in our experiment is a fixed, 
constant value common to all global bidders whereas the positive synergy in Kagel and 
Levin (2005) varies with the stand-alone value of the object.      
 
In their sealed-bid auction treatment, Kagel and Levin (2005) find that bidders overbid if 
they have low values, consistently bid above their values if they have intermediate values 
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and underbid if they have high values. When there are three local bidders, global bidders 
submit unequal bids for the two units.  When there are five local bidders, global bidders 
submit equal bids for the two units.  Efficiency is lower when there are three local 
bidders (91%-92%) compared to when there are five local bidders (94%).  Revenue is 
lower when there are three local bidders (9%) compared to when there are five local 
bidders (11%). 
 
Isaac and James (2000) test the demand-revealing properties of the Vickrey 
combinatorial auction.  This is an extension of the standard Vickrey auction to a multiple-
object goods auction, where synergies are obtained from packaging the objects.  The 
payment rule for the Vickrey combinatorial auction is similar to that of a Vickrey-Groves 
mechanism.  The winning bidder pays the total reported surplus of all the other bidders 
based on the alternative outcome in which the winning bidder is not a participant in the 
auction.  Two objects are auctioned to three bidders who demand both objects.  The 
authors compare performance between two auction formats: a simultaneous “two-bid” 
second-price sealed-bid auction and a Vickrey combinatorial auction.  The bidder submits 
three bids in the Vickrey combinatorial auction: one bid for each object and one bid for 
both objects as a package.  Within the Vickrey combinatorial auction, the authors have 
two treatments.  In one, a bidder who wins both objects individually and not as a package 
does not obtain the synergies associated with winning both objects together.  In the other, 
the bidder obtains synergies as long as they won both objects. 
 
Isaac and James (2000) study differs substantially from ours in the distribution of the 
values for the package.  In our study, all global bidders have the same common synergy 
value.  In Isaac and James (2000), the bidders first draw the values for each object from a 
uniform distribution of (0,5).  They subsequently draw another value for both objects as a 
package from a different uniform distribution of (0,10).  From this draw, in one treatment, 
bidders’ value for the package is allowed to be less than the summed values of the 
individual objects (sub-additive synergies).  In another treatment, bidders’ value for the 
package has to be greater than or equal to the summed values of the individual objects 
(super-additive synergies).      
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The authors find that bidders do not practice the dominant strategy of bidding their true 
values.  In the Vickrey combinatorial auction, bidders bid close to their true values only 
about 50% of the time.  Analyzing individual bidding behavior, the authors find that 
about 72% of the subjects are bidding their private values for the objects/package.  In 
terms of efficiency, the Vickrey combination has an average efficiency of 96%.  The 
simultaneous auction has an average efficiency of 91.5%.  When bidders do not obtain 
synergies from winning both objects, the authors find that efficiencies in the 
simultaneous auction drop further.  The average efficiency for the simultaneous auction is 
84.5%, compared to 96.5% for the Vickrey combinatorial auction. 
 
Our paper has a different experimental set up than Isaac and James (2000) and Kagel and 
Levin (2005).  In Isaac and James (2000), the number of global bidders remains constant 
throughout the treatment as the primary objective is to test the demand-revelation effect 
of Vickrey combinatorial auction rather than the effect of increased competition on 
bidding.  In Kagel and Levin (2005), there is one global bidder whereas we have multiple 
global bidders and we allow the number of global bidders to change across treatments.  
This enables us to test the theoretical prediction of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) that 
global bidders bid less aggressively with increased competition.  In addition, the local 
bidders in Kagel and Levin (2005) are played by computers that are programmed to bid 
their private values.  In our study, the local bidders are played by human subjects.    
 
3 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we summarize Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) predictions of equilibrium 
behavior in a simultaneous auction with positive synergies.  We first describe their 
auction set-up and subsequently review predicted equilibrium behavior that is relevant to 
our experimental design.   
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Consider a simultaneous second-price, sealed-bid auction for m objects.  For each object, 
there are n local bidders and k global bidders.  The local bidders demand only one object.  
The global bidders demand multiple objects.  The local bidder has a private value of x, 
whose value is drawn from the distribution FL, over the range [0,1].  The global bidder 
has a private value of x for each object, where x is drawn from the distribution FG, over 
the range [0,1].  If the global bidder wins more than one object, the total value of the 
package is bx + α: where b is the number of objects won, bx is the sum of the stand-alone 
values, and α  is the positive synergy from winning multiple objects. α does not vary 
with each global bidder’s private valuation of x.  α is a fixed, positive constant that 
applies to all global bidders, and whose value is common knowledge.  Local and global 
bidders adopt symmetrical bidding functions within their type.  
 
In the following paragraphs, we review the predicted equilibrium behavior of Krishna 
and Rosenthal (1996) in relation to our experimental design.  Our experimental auction 
environment comprises two objects, m = 2; one local bidder bidding for each object, n = 
1; two or five global bidders bidding for each object, k = 2 or 5 and positive synergies of 
α = 1 for global bidders who win both objects. 
 
First, consider the optimal bidding strategy for the local bidders.  In a second-price 
sealed-bid auction, the best response for local bidders is to bid their true valuation: 
 
( ) ,xxBL =    (1) 
 
where BL(.) represents the local bidder’s optimal bidding function, and x represents the local 
bidder’s private valuation for the object. 
 
Next, consider the optimal bidding strategy for the global bidders.  Global bidders submit 
two bids, one for each object.  Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) restrict their attention to 
equal-bid pairs.  The authors show theoretically that if the bids are not equal, the payoff 
resulting from one bid will be higher than that from the other bid, even though both 
objects have the same stand-alone value.  Therefore, the best response is to submit equal 
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bids for both objects.  We first consider the scenario where the average positive synergy 
attached to winning each object, 
2
α
≈s , is higher than the stand-alone value of each 
object, x.     
 
Local bidders draw their valuations from the range [0,1]. When the global bidder’s 
valuation x is such that sx ≥ , then the global bidder’s valuation (including synergies) for 
one object will be equal to or higher than the maximum possible private valuation of a 
local bidder for one object.  Consequently, local bidders cannot compete against the 
global bidder.  The auction thus becomes equivalent to a standard second-price sealed-bid 
auction for the package amongst the global bidders.  As a result, the global bidders bid 
their true valuation for each object: 
 
( ) sxsxxBG +=≥ ,  (2) 
 
where BG(.) represents the global bidder’s optimal bidding function, x represents global bidder’s 
private valuation for each object, and s represents the average positive synergy per object. 
 
When sx < , the global bidder has to compete against high-private value local bidders as 
well as global bidders with private values of sx < .  The differential bid function 
equation for any k is given in Equation 9 in Krishna and Rosenthal (1996).  A closed-
form solution for the optimal bidding function for the global bidder is: 
 
( )





+
+=≤
5
2
162
5
41
4
x
x
x
x
sxxBG      (3) 
 
Although the global bidder has drawn a low stand-alone private valuation, synergies 
provide a positive leverage to the global bidder.  The low-private value global bidder 
leverages on these synergies to bid competitively against the local bidders.  These 
synergies, however, may not be sufficient to allow low-private value global bidders to bid 
competitively against high-private value global bidders.   
when k = 2 
when k = 5 
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If the low-private value global bidder is effectively competing with the local bidders only, 
this implies that any potential losses due to aggressive overbidding are limited.  If local 
bidders bid optimally, the second-highest losing bid is a maximum bid of 1.  In other 
words, the “price-effect” is minimized.  Consequently, the low-private value global 
bidders may bid aggressively in order to win both objects and capture the positive 
synergies.  This behavior is reflected in Figure 1, which graphs the equilibrium bid 
functions of the global bidders.  When private values are around 0.2 – 0.5 for k = 2 and 
around 0.35 – 0.5 for k = 5, the sum of the predicted individual bids are higher than the 
total value of the package.  Kagel and Levin (2005) also predicted a similar “jump” in the 
bidding function at intermediate private values for uniform-price auctions.   
 
Before proceeding on to describe our experimental design, we provide a brief summary 
of the theoretical predictions of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) that can be tested with our 
experimental design: 
 
(i) Global bidders bid less aggressively when there is increased competition; 
(ii) Local bidders bid their private values for the object; and 
(iii) Global bidders submit equal bids for the two objects. 
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Bid Functions for Global Bidders 
 
Key: 
PV: Private Value Eqm Bid 2: Predicted bid when number of global bidders is 2 
CV: Combine Value Eqm Bid 5: Predicted bid when number of global bidders is 5 
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4 Experimental Design 
 
Following the auction setting in Krishna and Rosenthal (1996), we create a market where 
a seller sells two objects simultaneously in a second-price sealed-bid auction.  There are 
two types of bidders competing for the objects.  A local bidder bids for only one object 
and a global bidder bids for both objects.  The global bidder obtains positive synergies by 
winning both objects.  This positive synergy is a fixed, common value for all global 
bidders.  
 
In this paper, we investigate whether (i) global bidders bid less aggressively when there 
are more bidders; and (ii) package bidding leads to higher efficiencies and revenue.  Thus, 
the experiment tests for the effect of increased competition on bidding strategies and for 
the impact of the package bid option on revenue and efficiency.  Table 1 summarizes the 
experimental design. The experiment comprises four treatments, focusing on two factors:  
(i) increasing the number of global bidders , and  
(ii) varying the auction format.   
 
Table 1: Design of Treatments  
Treatment 
Type and Number of Bidders 
Number of 
Subjects 
Auction Format 
Local Global 
Number 
of Bidders 
per Group 
Simultaneous 
Bids 
Combination 
Bid 
SimOnly2 2 2 4 16 
BidOne, 
BidTwo 
 
SimOnly5 2 5 7 14 
BidOne, 
BidTwo 
 
SimCom2 2 2 4 16 
BidOne, 
BidTwo 
BidCom 
SimCom5 2 5 7 14 
BidOne, 
BidTwo 
BidCom 
Key: 
SimOnly2: Simultaneous-only auction with two global bidders. 
SimOnly5: Simultaneous-only auction with five global bidders. 
SimCom2: Simultaneous-Combination auction with two global bidders. 
SimCom5: Simultaneous-Combination auction with five global bidders. 
BidOne: Bid submitted for Object One. 
Bid Two: Bid submitted for Object Two. 
BidCom: Bid submitted for the package. 
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For the first factor, we test bidders’ behavior by increasing the number of global bidders 
from two to five.  Referring to Table 1, SimOnly2 and SimCom2 represent treatments 
where there are two global bidders.  SimOnly5 and SimCom5 represent treatments where 
there are five global bidders. In the experimental literature for testing the effect of an 
increase in the number of bidders, two experimental designs – cross-over and change-
over – are often applied (Battalio et al, 1990; Kagel and Levin, 1993).  These two designs 
primarily limit the impact of subject heterogeneity on bidding.  In our study, taking into 
consideration the fact that subjects have to bid in a multiple-object environment and that 
they have to change roles (global or local bidder) randomly during the game, inserting the 
two designs may further confuse the subjects.  Consequently, subjects may not be able to 
focus on how they should bid in the specified auction environment.  Therefore, we did 
not apply the two designs but rely instead on statistical methods to adjust for subject 
heterogeneity. 
 
For the second factor, we test for changes in revenue and efficiency in a simultaneous-
only auction against a simultaneous-combination auction.  Again, referring to Table 1, 
SimOnly2 and SimOnly5 are simultaneous-only auction markets where global bidders 
simultaneously submit two bids, BidOne for Object One and BidTwo for Object Two.  
SimCom2 and SimCom5 are simultaneous-combination auction markets where global 
bidders simultaneously submit three bids, BidOne, BidTwo, and BidCom for the two 
objects together as a package.      
 
In the SimOnly treatments, each object is awarded following standard second-price 
sealed bid auction rules: the highest bidder wins the object and pays the highest losing 
bid.  In the SimCom treatments, there is an additional combination option for the global 
bidders.  The seller can award the objects separately or award both objects as one 
package.  To determine the award, we compare the value from the highest of the package 
bids (BidCom) with the summed value of the highest of the individual bids for object one 
(BidOne) and the highest of the individual bids for object two (BidTwo).  If the summed 
value is higher, the objects are awarded separately.  Each winner pays the respective 
highest losing bid for each object.  If the value from the package bid is higher, both 
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objects are awarded as a package to one bidder.  The bidder who submits the highest bid 
for BidCom wins the package and pays the highest losing bid for the package. 
 
There are twenty-three periods in the auction market; the first three periods are practice 
periods.  In each period, for each group, there are two objects for sale.  Subjects are 
randomly arranged into groups.  Subjects are also randomly assigned to be either a local 
bidderiii or a global bidder in each period; hence, their role can change from one period to 
anotheriv.  Each subject is assigned a private value for a unit of the object at the beginning 
of each period and these private values are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution 
on the interval [0,100].  In the experiment, bidders are told their valuations in points, and 
bidders bid in points.  For the global bidders, the same private value applies to both 
objects.  In addition, global bidders obtain a positive synergy of 100 points when they 
win both objects.  This 100 point bonus is common to all global bidders. 
 
Bidders know their private valuations for the objects, the distribution from which other 
bidders’ private valuations for the objects are drawn, and the number of bidders.  At the 
end of each period, bidders are told what they won, if any, and the price they have to pay 
for the object/s.  A bidder’s profit is the difference between his/her value of the object 
and the price paid for the object.   
 
In all treatments, there are two local bidders: one for each object.  In the SimOnly2 and 
SimCom2 treatments, there are two local bidders and two global bidders in each bidding 
group.  In the SimOnly5 and SimCom5 treatments, there are two local bidders and five 
global bidders in each bidding group.  At the beginning of the experiment, all bidders are 
                                                 
iii In Kagel and Levin (2001, 2005), computers play the role of single-unit bidders and are programmed to 
bid their private value for the object.  In our design, subjects play the role of single-unit bidders and our 
results show that in some cases, local bidders do not play their dominant strategy of bidding their private 
values.  
iv In our game, winners of the auction predominantly tend to be global bidders.  If a particular subject ends 
up being a local bidder too often, this may cause overly aggressive or irrational bidding behavior to arise 
during the experiment.  Hence, in each treatment, we ensure that all subjects have equal opportunities of 
being assigned a global bidder.   
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given points that are equivalent in value to US$10v.  At the end of the experiment, these 
points are converted to cash at a pre-specified exchange ratevi that was announced in the 
instructions.  
 
Subjects were recruited from undergraduates and graduate students enrolled at the 
Pennsylvania State University.  No subject was allowed to participate in more than one 
session.  At the start of each session, instructions were read out-loud and at the end of the 
reading, the subjects took a short 5-minute multiple-choice quiz to make sure they 
understood the auction rules.  After going through the answers, the instructor started the 
experiment.  A total of twelve experimental sessions were conducted over three periods: 
April 2007, September 2007 and February 2008.  Three sessions were held for each 
treatment.  All sessions were held at the LEMA (Laboratory for Economic Management 
and Auctions) at the Pennsylvania State University and the experiment was programmed 
with the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher (2007).   
 
5 Experimental Results 
 
Twelve experimental sessions were conducted and observations from the last ten periods 
of each session are used in the analysisvii.  In total, our data consists of 3,713 bids.  
 
                                                 
v In Krishna and Rosenthal (1996), bidders are predicted to bid above their private values.  Given this 
possibility, subjects were given starting balances of US$10 in all treatments. The show-up fee of $5 was 
included in the starting balance.  On average, each subject earned $27(SimOnly treatments) and 
$25(SimCom treatments).  Each session lasted about 75 minutes.  There were two bankruptcies, one in 
SimOnly5 and one in SimCom5.  They were made to pay back the monies owed through clerical work at 
the rate of $10 per hour. 
vi The exchange rate for treatments with two global bidders is 0.045 and bidders have a starting balance of 
220 points.  The exchange rate for treatments with five global bidders is 0.15 and bidders have a starting 
balance of 70 points.  The exchange rates were set to equalize the expected earnings across the two 
treatments.   
vii We removed bids submitted by subjects who went bankrupt during the game.  One subject went bankrupt 
in the first SimOnly5 session.  This subject, despite answering the questionnaire correctly, misunderstood 
how the positive synergy component was awarded.  The other subject went bankrupt in the first SimCom5 
session.  This subject was bidding too aggressively in the first few periods of the game.  Their data was 
removed from the analysis.  The same instructor read the same instructions in the same manner in all 
sessions.  All subjects were recruited in the same manner.  We still use data from the two sessions in which 
these two subjects participated, because during the session, subjects were not given any other information 
than their private value of the object.   
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We test for the effect of increased competition on bidding behavior using the bid 
difference (BidDiff): 
 
it
itit
it
PV
PVBid
BidDiff
−
= , 
it
itit
it
CV
CVBidCom
BidDiffCom
−
= , 
where 
BidDiffit  : Percentage bid difference for the individual object by subject i in period t. 
BidDiffComit : Percentage bid difference for the package by subject i in period t. 
PVit  : Private value for the individual object of subject i in period t.  
CVit  : Value of the package, including the positive synergies of subject i in 
   period t. 
 
We refer to Table 2 for a summary of the average differences classified by auction format 
and private value.  High-private value bidders have in general much lower bid differences 
than low-private value bidders.  First, we look at the bidding behavior of the global 
bidders.  In the SimOnly treatment, high-private value global bidders bid 48% above the 
stand-alone value while low-private value global bidders bid about 214% above the 
stand-alone value.  In the SimCom treatment, for the individual bids, high-private value 
global bidders bid 5% above the stand-alone value while low-private value global bidders 
bid 87% above stand-alone value.  For the package bid, high-private value bidders bid 5% 
above the value for the package while low-private value bidders bid their private values. 
 
Next, we look at the bidding behavior of the local bidders.  In the SimOnly treatment, 
high- and low-private value local bidders tend to bid around their private values.  In the 
SimCom treatment, high-private value bidders have lower bid differences (7%-12%) than 
low-private value bidders (15%-30%). 
 
From these findings, we observe that when global bidders are not allowed to submit bids 
for the package, they bid above stand-alone values.  When global bidders are allowed to 
submit bids for the package, they lower their bids for the individual objects closer to their 
private values.   
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Table 2: Average Bid Differences by Treatments and Private Values 
Bidder 
SimOnly SimCom 
BidOne BidTwo BidOne BidTwo BidCom 
HPVG 0.48 0.48 0.05 0.05 0.05 
LPVG 2.09 2.19 0.88 0.86 0.00 
HPVL 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.07 - 
LPVL 0.03 -0.02 0.30 0.15 - 
 
Key 
HPVG : High-private value (51-100 points) global bidders. 
LPVG : Low-private value (0-50 points) global bidders. 
HPVL : High-private value local bidders. 
LPVL : Low-private value local bidders. 
 
 
5.1 Bidding Behavior 
 
First, we address our central research question: Do bidders bid more or less aggressively 
with increased competition?  We compare the bidding pattern between groups with two 
global bidders and groups with five global bidders.  We conduct a two-tail test for the 
null hypothesis that the two groups have the same bid differences, against the alternative 
hypothesis that the two groups have different bid differences. The hypotheses are tested 
using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and rank-sum tests.    
 
Conclusion 1: Global bidders bid less aggressively with more rival bidders. 
 
We refer to the predicted equilibrium bidding function of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) 
displayed in Figure 1.  We principally test for two points in the SimOnly treatments: (i) 
Low-private value global bidders bid less aggressively with increased competition; and 
(ii) High-private value global bidders have the same bidding strategy, regardless of the 
number of competing global bidders.  Our results support these two points.   
 
In the SimOnly treatments, low-private value global bidders are bidding less aggressively 
with increased competition.  Referring to Table 3, Panel A1, column (5), z-statistics are 
positive and highly significant for BidDiffOne (z = 2.006, p-value = 0.0448) and 
BidDiffTwo (z = 2.335, p-value = 0.0195).  High-private value global bidders, however, 
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apply similar bid differences in their bidding, even with more bidders.  Referring to 
column (3), although the bid differences are negative between the two groups, this 
difference is not statistically significant.  Therefore, for high-value global bidders we do 
not reject the null hypothesis that the bid differences are the same between the two 
groups. 
 
Surprisingly, we find that conclusion 1 extends to the package bids submitted by the 
global bidders in the SimCom treatment.  We wish to point out that Krishna and 
Rosenthal (1996) do not model the SimCom auction format.  Hence, their prediction that 
global bidders bid less aggressively with more rival bidders does not extend to the 
SimCom treatment.  In the package bid (BidCom), competition for the package is among 
the global bidders only.  Thus, one can view the package bidding as a second-price 
sealed-bid auction for one “object”.  Bidders’ best response is to bid their combined value 
for the package; thus, the number of bidders should not affect the bidding strategy.   
 
Our results indicate, however, that when global bidders place bids for individual objects 
as well as for the package and when they face competition from local bidders for 
individual objects, their bidding behavior changes with the number of global bidders.  
Referring to columns (4) and (6), the bid differences for the package bid are positive and 
highly significant for the global bidders.    
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When we look at the bid differences for the individual objects (BidDiffOne and 
BidDiffTwo) by global bidders in the SimCom treatment, we find that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the bid differences in the bids submitted by global bidders in a 
market with two global bidders are similar to those submitted by global bidders in a 
market with five global bidders (Table 3, Panel A1, columns (4) and (6)). 
 
For the local bidders, we find that high-private value local bidders bid less aggressively 
with more bidders, whereas low-private value local bidders have similar bid differences.  
Referring to Panel A2, columns (3) and (4), the z-statistics for the bid differences for 
high-private value local bidders are positive and are statistically significant.  The z-
statistics for the bid differences for low-private value local bidders, columns (5) and (6), 
are predominantly statistically insignificant.     
 
Besides using the Wilcoxon ranksum test to provide support for conclusion 1, we also 
conduct a random effects regression to obtain a more statistically rigorous test on the data.  
From our descriptive analysis, we find that the bid differences for bidding on individual 
objects display a decreasing slope: bid differences become smaller as private values 
increase.  Taking this into account, we fit the following random effects model to our data: 
 
( ) [ ],151 210 iti
itit
it es
x
D
x
xBidDiff ++++= βββ  
 
( ) [ ],5210 itiititit esxDxxBidDiffCom ++++= βββ  
 
where  
BidDiffit: Bid difference for individual object by subject i at time t. 
BidDiffComit: Bid difference for package by subject i at time t. 
itx
1
 : inverse of the private value of subject i at time t. 
itx  : Private value of subject i at time t. 
D5 : dummy variable that is equal to 1 when there are five global bidders. 
si : dummy variable for each subject. 
eit : error term. 
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In these regressions, we are principally interested in the sign and significant of β2.  We 
expect the sign for β2 to be negative.  When there are five global bidders, bid differences 
should decrease. We report the estimation results for the SimOnly treatments in Table 4 
and the SimCom treatments in Table 5 .  Results from the estimated regressions provide 
further support for conclusion 1.  In the SimOnly treatments, β2 is negative and highly 
significant for both the global and local bidders.  In the SimCom treatment, β2 is negative 
but is significant only for the global bidders, both for the individual object bids and for 
the package bid.   
 
The bottom panels of Table 4 and Table 5 present test statistics that check for the correct 
fitting of the regressions.  We apply the Hausman test to examine whether a fixed effect 
or a random effect model is more suitable for our data.  The Hausman test statistic for all 
the models rejects the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
other regressors in the model.  The random effects model is suitable for our data analysis. 
 
We apply the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to study whether a random 
effects or a classical regression is more appropriate for our data.  The LM test rejects the 
null hypothesis that variances of the groups are zero.  Hence, the classical regression 
model is inappropriate for our data.  We also apply the Breusch-Pagan LM test to check 
whether we have to account for period effects in the data.  In general, the chi-square 
values do not reject the null hypothesis that the variance components for periods are zero.  
Hence, we assume that the period effect does not have a significant impact on the bids 
submitted.  
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Table 4: Random Effects Panel Regression for SimOnly Treatments 
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Next, we compare the bidding behavior of bidders with respect to their private value of 
the objects.  We conduct a two-tail test for the null hypotheses that when bidding for the 
individual objects, bidders bid their private value of the object; and when bidding for the 
package, bidders bid their combined value for the package.  The alternative hypotheses 
are that bidders bid differently from their private value for the individual objects and 
combined value for the package.  We conclude that: 
 
Conclusion 2: Global bidders generally bid above their stand-alone valuations but below 
their predicted bids (given by equations 2 and 3) when bidding for the objects 
individually.  Global bidders bid above the value for the package with fewer rival bidders. 
 
First, we look at the case in which global bidders bid for the individual objects.  We refer 
to Table 6, Panel B1.  For the SimOnly treatments (columns (1) and (3)), bidders bid 
above their private value for the individual objects.  This is aligned with our earlier 
discussion in Section 2.1 that bidders bid above the stand-alone valuation for the 
individual object.  Our hypothesis testing confirms that this finding is statistically 
significant.  The z-statistics are positive and highly significant.  Global bidders bid below 
the predicted values given by Equations (2) and (3).  The z-statistics are negative and 
statistically significant. 
 
For the SimCom treatments, low-private value global bidders (column (4)) bid above 
their stand-alone values for the individual objects and bid above the combined value for 
the package when there are two global bidders.  High-private value global bidders 
(column (2)) bid above their stand-alone values for the individual objects and bid above 
the combined value for the package when there are two global bidders.   When there are 
five global bidders, at the 5% significance level, we do not reject the null hypothesis that 
global bidders bid at their private values for the individual objects, and they bid below 
their combined value for the package.  
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For the local bidders, we conclude that: 
 
Conclusion 3: Local bidders bid above their private values when there are two global 
bidders, but bid their private values when there are five global bidders. 
 
We refer to Table 6, Panel B2.  In general, local bidders in auction markets with two 
global bidders bid above their private values.  The z-statistics, shown in columns (1), (2), 
and (4), are positive and statistically significant.  The exception is the low-private value 
local bidders who bid at their private values.   
 
For local bidders in auction markets with five global bidders, local bidders bid at their 
private values.  The z-statistics are statistically insignificant at the 5% level; thus we do 
not reject the null hypothesis.  
 
Hereafter, we focus on the bidding patterns of the global bidders.  We test for three types 
of bidding behavior, whether: 
(i) Bidders submit equal bids for the two objects; 
(ii) Bidders follow a naïve strategy of splitting the positive synergies in their bids;  
(iii) Bidders in the SimCom treatments are bidding in favor of the combination bid. 
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Table 6: Hypotheses Testing 
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We look at the first type of bidding behavior.  We conduct a two-tail test for the null 
hypothesis that bidders submit equal bids for each individual object, against the 
alternative hypothesis that the bids are not equal.  We conclude the following: 
 
Conclusion 4: Global bidders submit equal bids for the individual objects. 
 
We refer to Table 7, Panel C1.  In general, all the z-statistics are statistically insignificant 
at the 5% level.  Hence, we do not reject the null hypothesis that bidders submit equal 
bids for the individual objects.  There is an exception to this finding.  High-private value 
global bidders in the auction market with 2 global bidder, participating in the SimCom 
treatment (column (2)) submit a lower bid for Object One than for Object Two (z = -
2.434, p-value = 0.0149). 
 
As a possible explanation of the bidding behavior observed in the experiment, we want to 
test whether bidders naively split the synergies in bidding for each individual object.  In 
other words, we want to test whether bidders adopt the strategy of bidding at private 
value plus fifty points for the individual object, for private values [0,100].  Note that this 
is the predicted optimal bidding function for high-private value global bidders in the 
SimOnly treatments, but not for the low-private value bidders. 
 
Conclusion 5: Global Bidders do not follow the naïve strategy of splitting the positive 
synergies for the individual objects. 
 
We refer to Table 7, Panel C2.  Global bidders do not follow the naïve bidding strategy.  
The z-statistics are negative and statistically significant.  We note that high-private value 
global bidders in the SimOnly treatments are bidding below the predicted bids. 
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Table 7: Hypotheses Testing 
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For the third type of bidding behavior, we want to test whether global bidders’ bids in the 
SimCom treatments exhibit a more aggressive bidding, vis-à-vis their private values, for 
the package than for the individual objects.  To recap, in the SimCom treatments, a global 
bidder submits three bids:  One bid for Object 1, one bid for Object 2 and one bid for the 
two objects as a package.  Consequently, when bidding simultaneously for the objects 
both individually and as a package, all bids are competitor bids.  To minimize the 
“exposure” problem, a bidder is likely to strategize the bids in favor of the package 
(Colwell and Yavas, 1994; Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996; Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 
2006).  Bidders in the SimCom treatment may be strategically placing their bets on the 
package option to win the objects as a package rather than winning each object 
individually.  In addition, the package bid eliminates the “exposure” problem by 
providing them with the certainty of winning both objects together and enjoying the 
positive synergies.   
 
Conclusion 6: When bidders have the option to bid for the objects both individually and 
as a package, bidders structure their bids in favor of the packaged bid. 
 
In the SimCom treatments, we note from results shown earlier in Table 6 that the global 
bidders bid above the stand-alone value for the individual objects.  However, our results 
in Table 7, Panel C3, columns (2) and (4), show that the summed value of the bids for the 
individual objects (hereafter referred to as summed value) is less than the combined value 
of the package.  This means that although global bidders are bidding above the stand-
alone value for the individual objects, the summed value is still below the combined 
value for the package.  More importantly, our results show that the summed value is 
below the bid for the package (Table 7, Panel C4). 
 
5.2 Efficiency, Revenue, Bidders’ Surplus 
 
In this section we principally compare three standard performance measures of auction 
mechanisms: allocative efficiency, sellers’ revenue and bidders’ surplus.  We compare 
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these performance measures on two levels.  The first is between the two auction formats 
and the second is the number of competitor bidders within the same auction format.   
 
Following the commonly used definitions of these measures in the literature, we define 
the three measures as: 
 
gt
gt
gt
MaxVal
WinVal
Eff = , 
gt
gt
gt
MaxVal
Paym
Rv = , 
gt
gtgt
gt
MaxVal
PaymWinVal
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−
= , 
 
where 
Effgt  : Allocative efficiency of bidding group g, in period t. 
Rvgt  : Revenue obtained by the seller from bidding group g, in period t. 
BSgt  : Bidders’ surplus of bidding group g, in period t. 
WinValgt            : Winning valuation of bidding group g, in period t.  If both objects are won by 
the same winner, WinVal = combined value of the winner.  If the two objects 
are won by two separate winners, WinVal = summed private values of the 
winners. 
MaxValgt          : Maximum valuation of the two objects of bidding group g, in period t. 
Paymgt              : Price paid to the seller by the winner/s of bidding group g, in period t. 
 
 
From our results, we arrive at the following conclusions: 
 
Conclusion 7: Efficiency and revenue are higher when package bidding is allowed. 
 
Conclusion 8: Revenue increases with more bidders
viii
.  Revenue also increases when 
package bidding is allowed. 
 
Conclusion 9: Bidders’ surplus decreases with more bidders. 
                                                 
viii At first this finding may seem contradictory to our earlier result that global bidders bid less aggressively 
with more rival bidders.  Our experiment utilizes a second-price sealed-bid auction whereby the winner 
pays the second-highest losing bid.  Consequently, even though global bidders bid less aggressively with 
increased competition, the price paid by the winning bidder, i.e., the expected value of the second highest 
bid, could still be higher when there are more global bidders.  Hence, this finding is not contradicting our 
earlier result. 
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We start by comparing the overall performance of the four treatments.  Figure 2 presents 
the average performance measures.  Allocative efficiency and sellers’ revenue are higher 
in the SimCom treatments than in the SimOnly treatments.  Allocative efficiency and 
sellers’ revenue increase when there are more rival bidders.  Controlling for the number 
of bidders, allocative efficiency and sellers’ revenue increase when global bidders are 
offered the additional option to bid for both objects as a package.  The reverse is true for 
the bidders’ surplus.  Bidders’ surplus is lower in the SimCom treatments than in the 
SimOnly treatments.  Bidders’ surplus decreases when there are more rival bidders.   
 
Next, we statistically compare the performance measures between different treatments.   
Table 8 summarizes the descriptive statistics.  Firstly, we look at the allocative efficiency 
measure. Within the same auction format, allocative efficiency is similar between auction 
markets with two global bidders and five global bidders.  Comparing between auction 
formats, allocative efficiency is higher in the SimCom treatments than in the SimOnly 
treatments.  In the SimOnly treatment, allocative efficiency increases when there are five 
global bidders (column (1): z=0.738, p-value=0.4606) whereas in the SimCom treatment, 
allocative efficiency decreases when there are five global bidders (column (2): z=1.900, 
p-value=0.0574).  However, these differences are not statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  Thus, we do not reject the null hypothesis that allocative efficiency within the 
same auction format is similar whether there are two or five global bidders.  Controlling 
for the number of bidders, we observe that allocative efficiency is 4%-7% ix higher in the 
SimCom treatments than in the SimOnly treatments.   When there are two global bidders, 
this difference is highly statistically significant (column (3): z=-3.573, p-value=0.0004).  
When there are five global bidders, this difference is significant at the 10% level (column 
(4): z=-1.868, p-value=0.0617).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
ix We took the difference in the average statistics.  When there are two global bidders, the difference is 7% 
(0.8957-0.9607=-0.065). 
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Figure 2: Performance Measures of the Four Treatments  
 
 
 
 
Secondly, we look at sellers’ revenue measure.  Within the same auction format, revenue 
is higher when there are more rival bidders, and the magnitude of this difference is lower 
when global bidders are offered an additional option to submit bids for both objects as a 
package.  These observations are highly statistically significant. In the SimOnly treatment, 
revenue increases by 21% when there are more rival bidders (column (1): z=-7.362, p-
value=0.0000).  In the SimCom treatment, revenue increases by 13% when there are 
more rival bidders (column (2): z=-4.336, p-value=0.0000).  Controlling for the number 
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statistically significant (column (3): t=-4.3057x, p-value=0.0000).  When there are five 
global bidders, we do not reject the null hypothesis that revenue is similar between the 
two treatments (column (4): z=-1.251, p-value=0.2111).   
 
Lastly, we look at the bidders’ surplus measure.  Within the same auction format, bidders’ 
surplus is lower when there are more rival bidders.  This observation is highly 
statistically significant and the difference is higher in the SimOnly treatment.  In the 
SimOnly treatment, bidder surplus is lower by 19% (column (1): t=5.9204, p-
value=0.0000).  In the SimCom treatment, bidder surplus is lower by 14% (column (2): 
z=4.596, p-value=0.0000).  Controlling for the number of bidders, we do not reject the 
null hypothesis that bidder surplus is similar between the two auction format (column (3): 
t=1.0935, p-value=0.2752; column (4): z=0.046, p-value=0.9630).           
 
                                                 
x Prior to running the Wilcoxon ranksum test, we run the Shapiro-Wilk test and the Skewness and Kurtosis 
test to check whether parametric or non-parametric comparison of means is more suitable for the variable 
under analysis.  When the parametric test is more suitable, we run the usual parametric F- and t- test for 
comparison of means. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
How would a bidder react when there are more competitor bidders?  When bidders 
demand only one object, bidders bid more aggressively to improve their chances of 
winning the object.  When bidders have multiple-object demand with positive synergies, 
they face an “exposure” problem.  If they bid above the stand-alone value for the 
individual object, they may make losses as they may not win all the objects to enjoy the 
synergies.  Consequently, when there are more bidders, the probability of incurring losses 
increases.  As a result, bidders are expected to bid less aggressively with more bidders.   
 
When a seller has multiple objects for sale and there exists positive synergies for these 
objects, what is the optimal way to sell these objects?  Should they be sold separately or 
as a package?  By selling multiple objects in a package, bidders are certain to obtain the 
positive synergies associated with the objects.  Thus, bidders would bid higher than the 
sum of the stand-alone value for the individual items.  Therefore, sellers should expect 
higher efficiency and revenue with package bidding.   
 
Our paper experimentally investigates the answers to the above two questions.  Following 
the model of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996), we conduct a simultaneous second-price 
sealed-bid auction for two objects and allow bidders to have the option to submit bids for 
the two objects separately as well as bids for both objects as a package.  Our results 
support the theoretical prediction Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) that bidders bid less 
aggressively with more bidders.  When bidders do not have the option to bid for the 
package, they generally bid above the stand-alone value for the individual objects, but 
below the equilibrium value predicted by the theory.  When bidders bid for both objects 
individually and have the additional option to bid for both objects as a package, they 
strategize their bids in favor of the package bid.  We also find that efficiency and revenue 
are higher when the package bid is offered.   
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